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"Standardrate" wage policies, under which all workers ina
particular job receive the same wage, are common for blue—
collar workers, especially those covered by collective
bargaining agreements and those who work for largeemployers.
This paper analyzes the impact of standard—ratewage setting.
There are two important conclusions. First,a standard—rate
rule which leaves the employer free to set therate can
either increase or reduce the quality of labor hired.Given
empirically likely distributions of alternativewages for
workers, it pushes employers toward the middle of the quality
distribution. Second, union standard—rate policies allow
Ufliofl—flOflufliofldifferencesin wages for workers of a given
qualityto exist even when unionemployers are free to alter
thequality of their workforces.
CharlesBrown
Institute for Social Research
The University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48106Standard-rate wage determination, under which all workers in a particular
job receive the same wage, is an empirically important policy which has
received little theoretical attention. One study of workers in metropolitan
areas found that 37 percent of the plant workers were paid under "single—rate"
plans which "provide the same rate to all experienced workers in the same job
classification," and an additional 16 percent were paid under a system whereby
one's progression through a range of wage rates in a job classification is
"based on automatic advancement according to length of service" (Cox, 1971, p.
54). Thus, over half of the plant workers were in compensation systems where
wages do not vary directly with performance within a job classification.
Buckley's (1985) study of 28 blue collar occupations focused on actual
wages paid rather than on wage-setting systems. In each occupation studied,
an establishment could fall into one of three groups: only one worker in the
job; several workers in the job receiving the same wage; several workers in
the job paid at two or more wage rates. In 13 of the 28 jobs categories, more
workers were in the second (single wage) group than in the multiple-wage
group. For those in the multiple-wage group, within—establishment, within—
job wage spreads were calculated (percent difference between high and low
wage). In half of the job categories, the mean within—establishment within—
jobwage spread was 18 percent or less. Both Cox and Buckley found much less
rate standardization among while collar workers.
Freemanand Medoff (19814, p. 80) found that unionized establishments are
much more likely than are nonunion establishments in the same industry to use
both single-rate and automatic progression wage determination (514% vs 27%
and 114% vs 8%, respectively). Brown and Medoff (19814) found a similar tendency
for larger establishments to adopt single-rate policies (holding unionization
constant). While Freeman and Medoff highlighted the implications of their
finding for wage inequality, there has been little theoretical discussion ofother implications of standard—rate policies. In this paper, I analyze the
effect of such policies by themselves and their effect when combined with a
union—imposed wage floor.
In section 1 ,Iconsider a firm which can hire as many workers of a given
quality as it wishes, so long as it is willing to pay the going wage for such
workers. In this case, the firm has no incentive to have unequal quality
workers in a given job (so standard rates are irrelevant).If unionized such
a firm simply upgrades quality until its workers receive no higher wage than
similar workers receive elsewhere. In section 2, I assume a firm faces a
limited number of potential workers of varying qualities, so a homogeneous
workforce (within a job category) is impossible. Such a firm will hire
workers of differing qualities and pay each quality its reservation wage.
Thus, a standard—rate requirement that all workers (in a job classification)
receive the same wage is a real constraint, even if the employer is free to
choose the wage. In section 3, a union which imposes a wage floor and a
standard—rate requirement is analyzed. Concluding comments are presented in
section .
Thereare two important conclusions. First, a standard—rate rule which
leaves the employer free to set the rate can either increase or reduce the
qualityof labor hired. Given empirically likely alternative—wage functions,
it will raise the quality of labor of employers who would otherwise hire low
quality workers and reduce it for employers who would otherwise hire high
quality labor. Second, union standard—rate policies allow union-nonunion
differences in wages for workers of a given quality to exist even when union
employers are free to alter the quality of their workforces.
21.Homogeneous Workforce
Inthis and subsequent sections, I assume that the firm has a fixed
number of vacancies per period (in a particular job) to fill, and that the
"quality" of each potential worker, q, is easily observed. It is convenient
to measure the quality of potential workers so that q is uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1. The value of marginal product of a worker of quality q is
v(q). All potential workers of quality q are assumed to have alternative wage
a(q). This abstracts from problems measuring q and from commuting costs or
other factors which would lead to different reservation wages among workers of
thesame quality. I assume v'(q) > 0 and a'(q) > 0, and v"(q) —a"(q)< 0.
In this section, I analyze a firm which can hire as many workers of





and it choses q so that v'(q)a'(q). The second—order condition v"(q) —
a"(q)< 0 guarantees a unique choice of q. Each worker receives a wage equal
to a(q).
Let q and a(q) be the firm's choice of quality level and its wage in
the absence of unionization. If the firm is unionized and required to pay
wage W > a(q), the firm's problem becomes
maxir =v(q)—
Wu subject to a(q) < W.
q
The firm simply upgrades its quality until a(q) =Itis forced to buy a
higher quality than it would choose in the absence of unions, but its workers
receive their alternative wage elsewhere. This upgrading until union workers
3receive no higher wages than comparable nonunion workersunderlies
Pettengill's (1980) general equilibrium analysis of unionization. Empirical
studies of individual workers who change union status confirm the conclusion
of simpler studies that, long after unionization first reached its current
level, union status raises wages. Reconciling the clear incentives to upgrade
with the apparently incomplete upgrading found empirically has remained
something of a puzzle.1
2.Heterogeneous Workforce
Now assume one firm faces a limited set of potential workers, again with
a uniform (0,1) quality distribution and alternative wages a(q). Let rbethe
ratio of vacancies to potential workers per period.
Thefirm's problem can now be written
H
max ir =I [v(q)
—a(q)]dqsubject to H —L=r.
H,L L
here H and L are, respectively, the highest and lowest quality of workers the
firm hires, and the simplified form of the constraint follows from the
convention that q is "measured" so as to have a uniform distribution. The
firm's problem can be written more simply by substituting out the constraint:
H
max r =I [v(q)—a(q)]dq.
H H-r




This is very similar to the first—order—condition for the firm in section 1:
equality of slopes over the range from H0—r to H0 replaces equality of slopes
14at the single quality q.
Now suppose that the firm is constrained -orchooses —topay the same
wage to all workers (in this job category).3 The firm's problem becomes
H
max ii=I [v(q)-W]dq subject to H -L=rand a(H) < W.
W,H,L L
Since v'(q) is always positive, the last constraint holds as an equality.
Again substituting out the constraints, we have
H
max ir =f [v(q)—a(H)Jdq
H H-r
The first —andsecond —orderconditions are
v(H) —v(H—r)=ra'(H)
and
v'(H) —v'(H—r)—ra't(H) < 0.
A natural question is whether the standard—rate rule has predictable
effects on the quality of labor which a firm hires. The simplest way of
answering this question is to formulate a slightly more general wage setting
policy. Let the wage paid to workers of quality q be a weighted average of






The first—order condition is
=v(H)-v(H-r)-(1-a)[a(H) -a(H-r)J-ara'(H) 0.
5Increases in a can then be interpreted as moves from a flexible—wage to a
standard—rate policy. Differentiating the first—order condition with respect




Thedenominator must be negative if the initial equilibrium maximized profits.
Thenumerator equals a(H) —a(H-r)—ra'(H).Since [a(H) —a(H-r)]/ris the
slopeof the chord joining H and H-r while a'(H) is the slopeof the tangent
atH, this expression is positive when a(q) is concave and negativewhen a(q)
is convex. Therefore, labor quality is increased by moves toward a standard
rate policy when a(q) is concave and reduced when a(q) is convex.4
The intuition behind this result is similar to that offered by Weiss
and Landau (1984, p. 483) for a related problem. When a(q) is concave
(convex) an increase (reduction) in q represents a move toward a q where
the frequency distribution of alternative wages is denser, and so (for
fixed r) a more homogeneous workforce is being chosen. It is intuitively
sensible that a firm which pays all workers (in a job category) the same
wage as its best worker will move toward recruiting a more homogeneous
workforce.
Under the assumption that alternative (market) wages are an exact
function of quality, the a(q) function is just the cumulative distribution
function of the market wage, but with the wage plotted on the vertical axis.
If wages follow a unimodal distribution, a(q) will be concave at "low" values
of q and convex at "high" values. For a symmetric distribution such as the
normal the change from concave to convex will occur at q=.5; if the median
exceeds the mode (as would be true, for example, for a lognormal
6distribution), the change from concave to convex will occur at q < .5, and
a(q) will be convex for most of its range.
Wage distributions for individual occupations in particular metropolitan
areas are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Area Wage Surveys.
While AWS excludes small establishments, it is in other respects an ideal
source of data for blue collar wages, offering both local-market detail and
reasonably narrow occupations.
The AWS contains data for 30 separate plant occupations such as
maintenance electrician, tool and die maker, boiler tender, tractor—truck
driver, and shipping packer. Using the surveys for the 10 largest SMSAs
studied by AWS in 1980, there were 27J4 city—occupations (30 times 10, minus 26
not reported due to too—small sample size). For each occupation, the wage
rate at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the wage distribution is
available. If the wage distribution is symmetric, W(75)—W(50)=W(50)—W(25),
where W(p) is the wage rate at the pth percentile. This implies that
—W(75)+W(25) —
2W(50)
is a simple measure of skewness, with S=1 if the distribution is symmetric.
If W(q) is ("predominantly") concave, S is less than one, while S is greater
thanoneif W(q) is ("predominantly") convex.
Of the 2711 city-occupation observations, S was less than 1.0 in 1140 —-
i.e.,in almost exactly half of the cases. Using an alternative measure ——
theratio of mean to median wage ——produceda nearly identical result (1143
values below 1.0) Thus, there is no evidence that strong positive or negative
skewness of within—occupation wage distributions is the rule.
7If wage distributions are unimodal and more or less symmetric, so that
a(q) switches from concave to convex near the median, the analysis of this
section implies that standard—rate policies move firms toward the middle of
the quality distribution. Firms initially hiring low quality workers face a
locally concave a(q) function and raise q, while those hiring high quality
workers face (locally) convex a(q) and reduce q.
3.Unions
While Freeman and Medoff (198) have argued that the standard rate is an
empirically important part of unionism, the preceding section does not really
characterize union wage setting. Perhaps the most satisfactory simple
characterization is that unions impose both a minimum wage constraint and a
standard rate rule. Formally, the firm's problem is
H
max f [v(q)-WJ dq subject to H -L=r,a(H) —W,and W > W.
W,H,L L
There are two cases to consider, depending on whether the final constraint is
binding.
(1) If the final constraint holds as an equality, the constraints
determine the choice variables: W =W,a(H)Wu determines H, and L H—r.
The highest-quality worker is paid his alternative wage, but the standard—rate
policy allows the remaining workers to earn more than their alternative wage.
There may be quality upgrading (H>H0) but it does not result in elimination of
a wage premium for being unionized.
(2) If the constraint W > W does not hold as an equality, the firm
pays more than the union-mandated wage but maintains the standard rate policy.
This case seems empirically unlikely but is not impossible. The model
of section 2 would be appropriate here. Once again, workers whose quality
is less than the highest receive more than their alternative wage.
8Thus, to the question "why doesn't employers' workforce—upgrading in
response to unionization eliminate any true wage differential?" an answer
is "standard rate policies prevent it."
Compared with those working for flexible wage nonunion employers (who
earn their alternative wage), union members earn a wage premium because all
those with q <Hare earning a(H) instead of a(q). Union workers receive
a standard rate a(I-i) which in general exceeds their alternative wage a(q)




To get a rough sense of the magnitudes involved, suppose a nonunion employer
has a within—job wage spread of 20 percent5 and that alternative wages are
uniformly distributed (a(q) is linear) in this region. A union establishment
which ended up with the same quality distribution of workers would pay its
best worker his alternative wage but its worst worker 20 percent more
than he could get elsewhere; on average, this firm's workers would have
M =.10,more or less in line with empirical estimates of the union wage
effect.
When a union organizes many firms in the same labor market and
negotiates the same standard rate at different firms, the effect may be
more dramatic. If, for example, half the workers are organized and the
wage is "taken out of competition" across firms, the least—qualified union
worker would earn the same as someone fifty percentile points higher in the
quality distribution. Notice that no reshuffling of workers across firms
eliminates this (perhaps very substantial) differential. This suggests an
alternative explanation for the proposition that union wage effects will be
9higher as the proportion organized is increased——increasing the share of the
market which is organized and achieving rate standardization across firms
increases the disparity of qualities of worker receiving the union wage,
and hence the true differential.
A further implication of the model is a comparison of those working
for nonunion standard—rate employers to those in the union sector. The
expression for M presented above holds for each type of firm. The
difference is that the union employer must pay a higher wage, and thus
obtaius higher q workers——i.e., N is evaluated at a greater H in the union
firm. The consequent effect on M is given by
dM—= a'(H)—(1/r)a(H) —a(H—r)]
As noted above, this expression is negative when a(q) is concave and positive
when a(q) is convex. Since standard rates are more common among larger
employers, who hire higher quality labor (Brown and Medoff, 19814), a concave—
then—convex a(q) function would mean that workers at large unionized employers
receive a premium compared to workers at large standard—rate nonunionized
employers. However, the union—nonunion differential for large employers
should be smaller than the union—nonunion differential for smaller employers
(whose nonunion sector follows flexible wage rather than standard—rate
policies). Most available evidence supports this prediction (Freeman and
Medoff, 19814.)
1LConclusions
The model presented in this paper shows how an employer who introduces a
standard rate policy would alter the quality of labor employed, and it argues
10that standard—rating explains the apparent inability of employers to take full
advantage of the upgrading opportunity which a union wage floor would seem to
present.
Three possible directions for future work are to attempt a general—
equilibrium analysis, to introduce imperfections in firms' knowledge of worker
quality, and to make the size of the firm (i.e. ,thenumber of vacancies
and/or the size of the available worker pool) endogenous in the long run.
I would expect the very simple relationship between standard rating and labor
quality would be complicated by these extensions; whether it would be altered
in a fundamental way is less certain. The effect of standard rating on a
unionized firm's attempt to upgrade would also be complicated by such
extensions, but I would expect the fundamental point to survive.
I have begun to work on the third generalization, by allowing the firm to
hire as many or as few workers as it finds profitable, while maintaining the
same general structure to the problem in other respects.6 I have not
established a simple analytic relationship between the quality of labor hired
in the flexible—rate and standard rate environments. However, for the case
where a(q) and v(q) are both quadratic, a large number of numerical examples
have failed to uncover a counterexample to the result in section 2, that
standard rates increase the quality of labor hired if and only if a(q) is
concave. (These examples are discussed in the Appendix.) Of course, the firm
finds it profitable to hire fewer workers, so it increases L and reduces H,
and profits are lower in the standard rate environment. If one is willing to
assume fixed capital costs per worker, such costs can be accommodated in a(q)
(and in W), and the model then characterizes long run behavior.
11FOOTNOTES
1. For example, Pencavel (1981) gives three possible explanations: (1)
studies which find a union wage premium have controlled inadequately for
worker quality; (2) employers are not free to hire the best labor
available at the union wage; (3) if the employer upgrades, unions will
simply negotiate a wage which represents a premium over the new workers'
opportunity wage. The first explanation is less convincing now that
studies which compare particular workers who change union status are
available. The second explanation applies to referral unions, but most
unions(e.g.in manufacturing) are not referral unions. The third
explanation requires that firms avoid hiring the best applicants for fear
that attracting better applicants will stimulate further wage-raising.
This seems implausible ——especiallyin the case of multi—employer
contracts, where the individual employer would have an upgrading
incentive even if the employer group did not. Mincer (19814, p. 3214)
argues that screening costs and "technological constraints" limit firms'
ability to upgrade enough to eliminate the union wage premium.
2. This formulation assumes the firm opts for a single range of worker
quality; it excludes, for example, hiring both low— and high—q workers
but not offering high enough wages to in—between quality workers to
attract them. The obvious motivation for this assumption is analytical
convenience.
3. In this paper, I take the decision to pay standard rates as given. A
more general model would explain why some firms not constrained by
union contracts opt for standard—rate policies. One way of achievingsuch generality is to postulate a fixed per—worker cost of administering
a flexible—wage system, identified with administrative costs (or morale
costs if workers prefer standard rates). Comparisons of flexible—wage
and standard—rate firms presented below could then be interpreted as
illustrating differences between firms whose wage policies differ
because of different costs of a flexible-wage system. My reason for
not putting greater emphasis on this approach is the belief that a
really satisfactory model of why some firms choose standard—rate policies
would require introducing costs of ascertaining worker quality (and
effort), which greatly complicates the analysis. The most similar
paper in the existing literature (Weiss and Landau, 1984) also takes
the standard—rate decision as exogenous.
4.This conclusion does depend to some extent on the assumption that the
pool of potential workers is given. An alternative assumption would
be this pool P can be expanded by "advertising costs" C(P), and the firm
hires r/P of the pool, where P is now a choice variable. (Measuring P
so that C(1) =0leaves the model in the text as a special case.) In
such a model, the effect of standard rates on average quality (or
average alternative wage) is quite complicated. First, holding P
fixed, increasing a changes H as described in the text. Second, holding
H fixed, increasing a increases P. The intuition here is that increasing
a increases the incentive to hire "more similar" workers, which can be
done by expanding P. This increase in P raises L (since L =H—rIP),raising average
quality. Third, the interaction between H and P is ambiguous in sign.
5.Buckley (1985) reports that the average within—establishment, within—job
spread in nonunion establishments was 25% for the median blue—collaroccupation in his study. This overstates the true size of the spread
to the extent that some of it reflects a pure—seniority differential for
which all workers eventually qualify, and because it excludes non—union
establishments paying all workers the same wage.
6. See also footnote 4 for a discussion of allowing the size of the
available worker pool to vary, holding the number of workers to be
hired constant.REFERENCES
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This appendix summarizes numerical solutions to the firm's
choice of labor quality problem when the firm has no constraint
on the number of workers it must hire.







If we normalize v(q) so that v(0) =0and v(1) =1,this implies
v0
=0and v2 =1—v1.Since v' (q)>0, v' (0) =v1> 0 and v' (1)
=2v2
+v1
=2—v1> 0, so v1 < 2. Similarly, a'(O) =a1> 0 and
a'(l) =2a2
+a1> 0,so a2 > —a1/2.
Furtherrestrictions on the aTs can be derived from the
requirement that L and H lie between zero and one in the









This means that L and H are the two solutions to the quadratic




2 —ii1/2 r —b1b0b21
Assume for now that b2 > 0. Then the two roots will be real
and distinct if and only if b0 < b12/4b2. Both roots are
positive and distinct if and only if b1 < 0 and r < —b1, which
in turn implies b0 > 0.Finally, the larger root is less than
one if and only if —b1+r < 2b2, which can be manipulated to show
b0 .>-b1—b2.Moreover, since r > 0, b2 must be greater than
—b1/2.
The second—order condition for the problem is that
vt(H) —a'(H)< 0
v'(L) —a'(L)> 0
This means that v'(L) —a'(L)—[v'(I-i)—a'(H)l=2(a2—v2) (H—L)
> 0, or a2—v2 =b2> 0, as asserted earlier.





o<a1 < v1(The latter since b1 =a1—v1< 0)
a2> v2 +(v1—a1)/2.(Since b2 > —b1/2)
a0 < (a1-v1)2/[(a2-v2)]
a0 > 0 and a0 > (v1—a1) +(v2—a2)(either could be binding).
Let N(v1) be the number of values of to be considered.
Evenly—spaced alternatives in the interval from zero to two were
chosen:
2v1 (i) =2i/[N(v1)1•
For each v1(i), N(a1) values of a1 were chosen, according to the
rule
a1 (j) v1 (i)/[N(a1) +1]




Placing the index k in the denominator is a somewhat ad hoc
response to the fact that no true upper bound on a2 could be
derived. Finally, given v1, a1, and a2, N(a0) values of a0 were
chosen according to the rule
a0() = max(0, v1-a1 ÷v2-a2)
r 1(a1-v1)2 +L 1
- ] N(a2÷1)
In addition to finding the solution to the firm's problem in the
flexible—wage case, the solution to the standard—rate problem was
also determined for each set of parameters. Here, the firm seeks
to
H H
max v =f [v(q)—a(H)1dq =.1 v(q)dq—(H—L)a(H).
H,L L L
The first—order conditions for this problem are
3v(H) —a(H)—(H—L)a'(H) =0
—v(L) +a(H)=0
Rewriting the second equation as
-[v(H)-a(H)J +v(H)-v(L)=0
Adding this to the first equation gives
v(H)—v(L) —(H—L)a'(H) =0
In the quadratic case, this is





Since H—L > 0, the term in brackets is zero, and this is a linear
equation which can be solved for L:
L =—If+(2a2H+a1—v1)/v2
This can be substituted into the first first-order condition to
obtain a quadratic equation in H alone.
In the first set of experiments, I chose five values forv1,
a1, and a2, and three values for a0 according to the above rules.
There were therefore 3.53= 375sets of parameters. When this
produced very few negative values of a2, the procedure was
revised to allow nine values of v1, running from 1.1 to 1.9, with
the same number of values (but, obviously, different numerical
values) of a1, a2, and a0 as before.In no case did average
14quality (measured by either q or a(q)) rise when a2 was positive
orfallwhen a2 was negative.
5